Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. In a preceding paper, BBD 1993], we considered 4 systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for rst order intuitionistic propositional and predicate logic. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. Both translations are closely related in a canonical way. In the cited paper we proved completeness of the two direct translations. In the present paper we prove that also the two indirect translations are complete. These proofs are direct whereas in an earlier version, of August 1995, we proved completeness by showing that the two corresponding illative systems are conservative over the two systems for the direct translations. Moreover we shall prove that one of the systems is also complete for predicate calculus with higher type functions.
Introduction
In BBD 1993] we introduced 4 systems of illative combinatory logic (ICL). We derived roughly the following soundness result `L A ) ]`C A]; where L represents propositional or predicate logic and ?] one of two possible translations of each system into an ICL system C. Of the interpretations one is the propositions-as-types interpretation due to Curry, Howard and de Bruijn, the other is a more direct interpretation.
We derived completeness results for the direct translations of propositional and predicate calculus into 2 of the 4 systems of ICL. These, again roughly, took the following form ]`C A] ) `L A:
In the present paper we shall prove that also the two indirect translations are complete. These completeness results imply the consistency of the ICL's involved. Moreover we shall prove that one of the systems is also complete for predicate calculus with higher type functions.
Some de nitions of preceding paper
This paper is a continuation of a preceding paper, BBD 1993] , by the same authors. We will refer to that paper most of the time simply as B; so for example De nition B2.1 means De nition 2.1 in BBD 1993] . In this section we repeat some de nitions of BBD 1993] that are needed in the present paper. For an introduction into ICL-systems, motivations, examples, propositions with proofs, and references we refer to BBD 1993] .
2.1. Definition (De nition B2.1; the logic system PROP). PROP is the fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic determined as follows.
(i) The set of formulas of PROP, notation F PROP , is de ned by the following abstract syntax F PROP = V j F PROP F PROP :
Here V is a set of propositional variables.
(ii) Let ? F PROP and '2F PROP . Then ?`P ROP ' is de ned by the following system of natural deduction. PROP '2? ) ?`'; ?`' ; ?`' ) ?` ; ?; '` ) ?`' : 2.2. Definition (De nition B2.2; the logic system PRED). PRED is the f ; 8g fragment of rst order many-sorted intuitionistic predicate calculus of a given signature s.
Below as an example, we will treat a version of PRED with s the signature of the structure < A 1 ; A 2 ; f; g; P; a > with A 1 ; A 2 nonempty sets; f : A 1 ! A 1 a unary function; g : A 1 ! A 2 ! A 1 a binary function; P A 1 a unary relation; a2A 1 a constant.
(All results also hold for arbitrary signatures.) (i) The set of terms of PRED, notation T PRED , is de ned by the following abstract syntax.
T PRED = T A 1 j T A 2 ; T A 1 = V A 1 j a j fT A 1 j gT A 1 T A 2 ;
T A 2 = V A 2 :
(ii) The set of formulas of PRED, notation F PRED , is de ned by the following abstract syntax. ?`'; x A i 6 2FV(?) ) ?`8x A i ':
The systems PROP and PRED are being interpreted in ICL's by two kinds of embeddings. The rst kind is`direct' and the second kind is according to the`propositions-as-types' and`proofs-as-terms' paradigm. As there are two logical systems, PROP and PRED, there G ; x l x sk(l) ; x l i x sk(l) i ; y l y sk(l) ; y l i y sk(l) i :
De nition of T l G : (i) l( x l :pt) = Gl( x l :p)( x l :t);
(ii) Gl( x l :p)t = l( x l :p(tx l )); x l 6 2FV(t);
(iii) l( x l :pt p ) = Gl( x l :p)t Gl( x l :p) ; for t Gl( x l :p) = x l :t p ; (iv) Gl( x l :p)t Gl( x l :p) = l( x l :pt p ); for t p = t Gl( x l :p) x l ;
Proof. (i),(ii) immediately from the de nition of G; and illative contexts respectively are extended to mappings from F PRED ! 0 by altering some clauses and adding some clauses in the following way. (2) From (1) and (2) 6.5. Remark. Ordinary predicate logic PRED can be expressed by the pure type system (PTS), see Barendregt 1992] Inspecting the 4 proofs for r = I in this paper and in BBD 1993] one can verify that all these proofs need only minor changes to yield proofs for r = K:
Let us consider as an example the proof of completeness of IG for PRED ((iv) As a result then T p G = s ( ; L) for each p2P GK : These are nearly all changes that are needed to get a proof for r = K from the proof for r = I in section 4.
In an earlier version of this paper, DBB 1997], we were not yet able to give completeness proofs of IG for PRED and IF for PROP ((iv)( and (iii)() by specialising to r = I. We there gave completeness proofs by taking r = K; in a way di erent from the method sketched above. Let us consider now the proof of completeness of IG for PRED in BBD 1997] did not use the fact that P; F and G were de ned in terms of : Also completeness remains valid because the systems with P; F and G constant are less strong than
